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of an Irrationalist Form 
Stuart E. Baker* 
Tragedy, like farce, has suffered at the hands of the critics of genre and for 
similar reasons. Our understanding of both genres has been distorted by 
judgments passed off as definitions. O u r view of the one has been colored by 
scorn and our vision of the other obscured by reverence. 
Although comedy and tragedy are linked together as if they were a 
symmetrically balanced pair of complementary opposites like yin and yang, 
night and day, or black and white, when critics actually get down to cases they 
treat the two genres quite differently. It is true that such complementary 
definitions of comedy and tragedy were standard throughout the middle ages 
and the Renaissance, but that fact is generally regarded by moderns as just 
another symptom of a superficial approach that substituted formulas for 
genuine understanding. T h e neoclassical definition of tragedy is particularly 
subject to scorn; for how could presumably intelligent people have been so 
dense, we think, as to reduce the most sublime product of the Western literary 
genius to such a simple and conventional formula. We applaud ourselves that 
we understand tragedy so much better than did the Renaissance critics; and 
yet, we are not sure that we can create any tragedies of our own. We are 
appalled at the triteness of the neoclassical way of defining tragedy, for, to us, 
tragedy is a thing so very special that we are disinclined to apply the label to 
any but masterpieces and are apt to believe that the capacity to create tragedy 
is granted only to a few special epochs—perhaps only to two ages in history. 
One of those periods, of course, was the Renaissance. 
Why is it that an age so clever in the production of tragedy should be so 
clumsy in its definition? The fault, I think, lies more in the unreasonable 
demands that we have placed on tragedy than on any lack of sophistication on 
the part of the Renaissance critics. When comedy is discussed, we may differ 
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about its nature but we are agreed that individual comedies might range from 
the most brilliantly sublime to the most wretchedly inept. We do not grant the 
same freedom to tragedy. Tragedy must be sublime or we will drum it out of 
the corps. We will not tolerate a second-rate tragedy. However it may 
superficially resemble tragedy, if it is bad, then it must be something else: 
melodrama, tragicomedy, or domestic drama are permitted categories, but 
the second-rate drama must never presume to be tragic. 
However flattering this might be to the muse of tragedy, it is unfortunate 
from the point of view of our understanding. Our propensity to rank 
categories unnecessarily obscures them with all of the difficulties attendant on 
providing objective criteria for value judgments. Genre studies may well have 
fallen into disfavor because of the unspoken assumption that such categories 
should be at least loosely ordered into a hierarchical Great Chain of Being. 
When we insist that our categories of drama have an assigned rung on the 
ladder of our esteem as well as clearly defined and objectively determined 
distinctions, we have hopelessly muddied the issue. The forms at the extreme 
ends of the value system suffer the most from the rating scale; farce, on the one 
hand, is dismissed as unworthy of study, and the demands of tragedy are so 
great that our difficulty is simply to create a definition that will retain only 
masterpieces, ruthlessly excluding all lesser works. 
Thus we get endless and unresolvable discussions about whether or not 
Anouilh's Antigone and Miller's Death of a Salesman are really tragedies. The 
reason such discussions are unresolvable is that while they pretend to be about 
the applicability of certain objective criteria of tragedy, they are really about 
admission to an elite club. Thy are concerned with the question of whether 
such plays deserve to be admitted into the company of Hamlet, Oedipus, and 
King Lear. If, however, that were the only question, most people would 
probably have a clear, unambiguous opinion: that they indeed do not. Yet we 
may still be able to find a significant family resemblance among these plays 
that will increase our understanding of all five. 
I suggest that we attempt the experiment, that we admit the possibility of a 
bad tragedy just as we do of a bad comedy and see if that helps us to better 
understand a significant portion of our dramatic heritage. I wish not to 
present here a complete new theory of tragedy but to show how a value-free 
definition of tragedy can clarify and focus already established notions about 
tragedy and eliminate much unnecessary confusion. 
I should make it clear at the outset that my approach to genre is that of 
strict, no-nonsense nominalism. I do not believe that there is such a thing as a 
perfect tragedy somewhere in the realm of ideas. General categories are useful 
to the extent that they call attention to significant patterns of similarity 
between individuals. They are a way of observing the forest without forgetting 
entirely about the trees. Genre classifications are significant because they 
reveal fundamental patterns in the way we organize experience through art; 
those basic patterns can be endlessly varied to reflect infinite individual 
visions. 
I also insist on being prosaically clear and unambiguous about the terms of 
our definitions. Let us attempt to define the genre in terms, not of its 
"essence," but of its boundaries, lest we arrive at a definition so narrow it 
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embraces but a handful of exemplars. I see no need for poetical or 
metaphysical definitions of tragedy. Joyce 's "secret cause" is wonderfully 
evocative, but it represents what might be called "poetic criticism" as 
opposed to criticism qua criticism (239). Likewise, any appeal to the arousal of 
' ' true tragic feelings" or the like must be rigorously excluded. Imagine what a 
waste of time it would be to argue about whether Barefoot in the Park allowed us 
to experience true comic feelings. We can certainly compare Neil Simon to 
Moliere, and even rank them, without having to resort to such hopelessly 
subjective criteria of the genre we call comedy. 
Let us, just to see what will happen, try a fresh approach to the task of 
defining tragedy. We obviously cannot ignore what others have said about 
tragedy; language, as de Saussure observed, is a product of the group rather 
than the individual. We wish not to create an idiosyncratic (and thus effete 
and useless) definition of this important term. Rather we must attempt to 
remove the value judgments and the attendant mysticism that engulf our 
notion of tragedy to see what lies within. We should look for defining 
characteristics that have two qualities: they should be generally recognized as 
diagnostic by major critics, and they should be relatively unambiguous. They 
should be part of the common understanding of what is tragic, yet capable of 
distinguishing one play from another. T h e defining characteristics of tragedy 
should be such that we can generally agree whether they exist in any particular 
play. I insist on this last point because so many things said about tragedy do 
not meet it. It is usually very difficult, for example, to determine with 
certainty whether a given protagonist has achieved " t rue understanding" of 
himself. 
What then are the themes or traits that recur in discussions about the 
nature of tragedy? Essentially there are two major fields excavated by the 
definers of tragedy. Many attempt to define tragedy in terms of its world-view 
or philosophy, especially with respect to the question of theodicy or the 
problem of evil. Others focus on the nature of the protagonist, usually either 
in terms of something that might be called her or his stature, or in terms of the 
moral characteristics of the hero. 
There are major differences of opinion among those who look to define the 
Weltanschauung of tragedy. The extremes are marked: on the one hand there 
are critics like LA. Richards, who insist on a bleak and stark vision. 
"Tragedy," says Richards, " is only possible to a mind which is for the 
moment agnostic or Manichaean. The least touch of any theology which has a 
compensating Heaven to offer the tragic hero is fatal" (246). At the other 
extreme is Walter Kerr, who declares that " tragedy is the form that promises 
us a happy ending. It is also the form that is realistic about the mat te r" (36). 
The mere fact of such diversity of opinion would by itself suggest that tragedy 
might not best be defined by its world-view, but there is a deeper reason for 
avoiding the "tragic view of life" as a defining characteristic, one well 
illustrated by the extraordinary debate that raged a few decades ago over the 
compatibility of tragedy with the Christian view of life. 
Numerous critics felt compelled at that time to publish their conviction 
that the tragic and the Christian views are incapable of reconciliation. Michel 
and Sewall gathered a fair sampling of these opinions in their collection of 
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essays on tragedy, the flavor of which may be had from a few quotations. 
According to Clifford Leech, " the tragic picture is incompatible with the 
Christian faith. It is equally incompatible with any form of religious belief that 
assumes the existence of a personal and kindly God ' ' (Michel and Sewell 172). 
David Raphael says that " the religion of the Bible is inimical to Tragedy . . . 
because it is optimistic and trusts that evil is always a necessary means to a 
greater good . . . " (51). And likewise Richard Sewall: " I n point of doctrine, 
Christianity reverses the tragic view and makes tragedy impossible" (50). 
And Karl Jaspers (often quoted by such critics) declares: "Christian salvation 
opposes tragic knowledge. The chance of being saved destroys the tragic sense 
of being trapped without chance of escape. Therefore no genuinely Christian 
tragedy can exist" (Michel and Sewall 13). Michel sums up: " I n whatever 
theological, philosophical, cultural, or pragmatic terms Christian optimism 
expresses itself, it is grounded in enthusiasm not for the natural powers of man 
but for the supernatual fact of redemption. At the root of the question of living 
in a vale of tears, then, there is a basic incompatibility between the tragic and 
the Christian view" (223). Many specifically cite Shakespeare as presenting 
the tragic (non-religious) point of view. Thus Jaspers declares that Shake-
speare "moves across a purely secular stage" (7) and "under every possible 
aspect he shows man as he really is. But the specifically religious—and only 
this—escapes h i m " (14). 
Most (although not all) of these critics seem unaware that scholars like 
Lilly B. Campbell and Willard Farnham had demonstrated that Renaissance 
tragedy had developed out of a Medieval Christian tradition that saw tragedy 
specifically as demonstrating the impermanence and unreliability of worldly 
things (cf. Doran 125). In that tradition, the "tragic view" held that it is 
precisely because, in this world, the great and powerful fall and the innocent 
suffer that we should put our faith in the next. This is not exclusively a 
medieval view; it is exactly what Schopenhauer understood by " the t rag ic" 
(2:433-34). While Elizabethan, and certainly Shakespearean, tragedy went 
beyond such a viewpoint, it did not (and this is the essential point) exclude it. 
Ellis-Fermor presents a more inclusive view when she says that the " t ragic 
mood is balanced between the religious and the non-religious interpretations 
of catastrophe and pa in" (17), but even this misses the point. The point is that 
no philosophy, either optimistic or pessimistic, is the defining characteristic of 
Shakespearean tragedy. Even if we look at the play most often cited as 
evidence of Shakespeare's bleak pessimism, we notice that although Cordelia 
as well as Lear is "more sinned against than sinning," the major sinners— 
Edmund and his various allies—are thoroughly defeated. It is true that there 
is no suggestion in King Lear of " a compensating Heaven ," but it is also true 
that Lear's Britain, unlike Hamlet 's Denmark, has been made by Shake-
speare explicitly pagan. King Lear, often thought to be the most tragic of 
tragedies, looks unblinkingly at innocent suffering. Christian philosophers 
may have had trouble answering the question, " W h y do good people 
suffer?," but the tragic view is incompatible only with the view of those 
persons, Christian or not, who deal with that question by refusing to think 
about it. The fact is that it is possible for a confirmed atheist and a devout 
Christian to sit side by side at a performance of King Lear, for each to be 
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profoundly touched, intellectually as well as emotionally, without either 
having been in the least shaken in his religious or philosophical convictions. 
Tragedy—"great" tragedy, if you will—looks hard and searchingly at pain 
and suffering; we must make of that what we can, according to our own lights. 
It is really quite hopeless to try to establish a characteristic world-view, 
philosophy, or attitude to life as a defining trait of tragedy. Unless, that is, 
when we give up trying to determine whether tragedy is pessimistic or 
optimistic, we conclude that it is always neither or both. Certainly when 
tragedy ends on a clearly optimistic note (like the Oresteia taken as a whole) we 
wonder whether it is really tragic. And a thoroughly pessimistic play, strangely 
enough, is usually called a tragicomedy; Duerrenmatt ' s The Visit, and 
Ionesco's The Killer are good examples, but almost any "Absurdis t" play will 
serve. 
This characteristic ambiguity is part of a pattern that has its origin in the 
other major concern of tragic theorists—the nature of the tragic protagonist. It 
is a pattern that can be observed in the remarks of nearly everyone who 
comments on the nature of tragedy. There is a tendency for the theorists of 
tragedy to use words like "dividedness ," "ambivalence ," "pa radox" and 
"conflict" to describe what they take to be its essential nature. Aristotle 
suggests something of the sort by asking for a hero who is neither wholly good 
nor wholly bad. Hegel claims tragedy is the conflict of good with good (4: 
295-98, 319-22), and Bradley, following him, broadens the concept to include 
more than strictly moral issues (85-88). Robert Heilman suggests that the 
"dividedness" of the hero is the hallmark of tragic drama, which he contrasts 
to the wholeness of characters in melodrama (14-19). Richard Sewall says that 
the suffering of the tragic hero is not just physical but also "mental or spiritual 
anguish as the protagonist acts in the knowledge that what he feels he must do 
is in some sense wrong—as he sees himself at once both good and bad, 
justified yet "unjustified" (47). To Northrop Frye, "tragedy is a paradoxical 
combination of a fearful sense of Tightness (the hero must fall) and a pitying 
sense of wrongness (it is too bad that he falls)" (214). Kierkegaard suggests a 
moral ambiguity about the tragic hero, contrasting genuine evil with "truly 
tragic guilt in its ambiguous innocence" (117). Max Scheler sees the essence 
of tragedy as a conflict between a "positive value and the very object which 
possesses i t" and goes on to say that " 'tragic guilt' is a kind for which no one 
can be blamed and for which no conceivable ' judge' can be found" (Michel 
and Sewall 31, 39). 
There are two other characteristics usually associated with this special 
dramatic form: sacrifice and punishment, which are somewhat confusingly 
and paradoxically brought together under the heading of expiation. I say 
confusingly, because, as Bernard Shaw points out in the Preface to Androcles 
and the Lion, sacrifice requires the suffering of the innocent—the more spotless, 
the better—while punishment is the retributive suffering of the guilty. 
Although they are equally the product of, in Shaw's words, " the notion that 
two blacks make a whi te" (4: 470), they require precisely opposite types of 
victims. Yet these incompatible concepts of sacrifice and suffering often appear 
mixed together in discussion of tragedy and the tragic hero (e.g. Krook 17, 
Brereton 73); a fact which suggests that the dividedness seen by Frye in our 
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attitude to the tragic hero is related to the ambiguous moral status that 
Kierkegaard sees as central to the nature of the protagonist. 
The attempt to rationalize this divided attitude has confused even the most 
insightful of commentaries. A good example is Max Scheler's excellent and 
provocative essay, " O n the Tragic" (Michel and Sewall 27-44). One of 
Scheler's major concerns is the question of guilt in tragedy. Although the fatal 
catastrophe of tragedy is the inevitable consequence of the actions of the 
characters, he says that it is not possible clearly to assign guilt. " W e may use 
the term 'tragic' " he asserts, "only when we feel that everyone concerned in 
the story has hearkened to the demands of his duty with the utmost of his 
capabilities, and yet the disaster has had to occur ' ' (38). Yet he insists on using 
the term "tragic guilt ," which he links to the idea of a "nob le" man whose 
vision of a higher morality than that discernible by his own age brings him 
into conflict with the morality of his own time. " H e must necessarily appear 
'guilty' even before the fairest judge, when he is in fact guiltless and is so seen 
by God alone" (42). Now if we objectively apply this standard as I have 
presented it so far it would appear that Saint Joan is the quintessential tragedy. 
In fact Shaw defends his play as a tragedy on much those same grounds in the 
preface (6: 72). Scheler seems to sense the difficulties that this position raises, 
because he qualifies his argument—but qualifies it in ways that produce 
confusion and contradiction. Even while exonerating such tragic heroes, he 
refers to their "tragic guilt ," which he sees as necessary and "guiltless guilt" 
(42). While the type of tragic hero who is endowed "with moral awareness," 
writes Scheler, " is obviously essentially the opposite of a sinner, he can not be 
distinguished from a sinner by the age in which he l ives." At first glance Saint 
Joan appears even more clearly as Scheler's perfect tragedy, but he concludes 
that "there are no present tragedies—there are only tragedies of the pas t" 
(42). Now I find this to be rather peculiar. It means that a certain kind of 
moral blindness is required to produce tragedies, or at least is required of the 
age in which tragedies are produced. It means that Saint Joan, by these 
standards so perfect a tragedy in every other way, must finally be excluded 
from that class by the fact that author and audience are fully aware of its tragic 
qualities; it means that Shaw, by insisting on the Epilogue because he 
demands that we see the " canonized Joan as well as the incinerated o n e " (6: 
75)—that is, because he insists on pointing up the very qualities of his play 
that Scheler finds essentially tragic—is by the very same stroke irrevocably 
excluding his play from the realm of the tragic. 
Unfortunately, Scheler is entirely innocent of conscious irony. A few 
paragraphs later he denounces the common notion that tragedy is the 
consequence of "moral guiltiness" by affirming that "only total blindness for 
the phenomenon of tragedy could hatch out this silliest of theories" (43). 
Perhaps the theory is wrong, but can it really be so "si l ly" if it must be held 
by any age that produces tragedies, as indeed it was nearly the only theory 
thinkable in the centuries of Shakespeare and Racine. 
An alternative to this kind of confusion in the way we regard tragedy is the 
recognition that tragedy inevitably contains such illogical and ambivalent 
morality, that it embodies an archetypal pattern containing not only what Frye 
calls a "mimesis of sacrifice" (214), but also what we might call a mimesis of 
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"just retr ibution." Frye himself suggests that there are two " reduc t ive" views 
of tragedy which "represent extreme or limiting views" of the genre. One is 
the view of tragedy as representing the "omnipotence of an external fate" and 
the other is that it depicts a downfall brought about by the violation of a moral 
law. Frye concludes that they are limiting views because while each is "almost 
good enough" they are contradictory (209-10). Another conclusion is possi-
ble: that the form itself is inherently contradictory because it actually 
combines both views. This is what is implied by Racine when he defends his 
Phaedra as a truly tragic heroine by saying that "he r crime is a punishment of 
the gods rather than an urge flowing from her own will" (145). Cairncross, in 
the introduction to his translation of the play, develops Racine's view of the 
heroine—that she was " d o o m e d " to be guilty—as the foundation for his 
assertion that " there is no more profoundly tragic work than Racine's 
masterpiece" (141). Observe also how the theorists of tragedy slip into 
oxymoron when discussing the ethical qualities of the hero. Hegel insists that 
tragic heroes are as much guilty as innocent and are even proud of their guilt 
(320-21); Kierkegaard refers to " t ruly tragic guilt in its ambiguous inno-
cence" (117); and Scheler says that tragic guilt is "guiltless guilt" (42). 
"Guiltless gui l t ." Like other epithets of " t r u e " tragedy, it is a phrase that 
summons up echoes of Sophocles first tragedy of Oedipus. But such am-
bivalent—or contradictory—mythic patterns are common outside, as well as 
within, the Western tradition. It will be instructive to examine a legend which 
is similar to the myth that our tradition finds seminally tragic, yet has marked 
differences that reflect its cultural origin. 
Bronislow Malinowski recounts a legend of incest and death in the tales of 
the Trobriand Islanders, who inhabit a group of small islands off eastern New 
Guinea. Malinowski was interested in Freudian psychology and tried to 
discover what significance the Oedipus complex could have in this culture—a 
culture in which fatherhood does not exist because these people do not 
recognize a causal relationship between the sexual act and pregnancy. 
Marriage is exogamous and there are incest taboos against mother-son 
relationships, but the most important taboo prohibits the relations of brother 
and sister. Violation of the mother-son prohibition is a serious breach but is 
not thought at all probable; it is consequently not invested with much 
emotional energy. The brother-sister taboo, on the other hand, is greatly 
feared and accompanied with an entire array of social codes aimed at its 
reinforcement. Brothers and sisters are not even allowed to be in each other's 
company except under highly controlled circumstances, and they are expected 
to be exceedingly circumspect even in talking about each other. In short, 
violation of the sister-brother incest taboo is seen both as a terrible sin and a 
great temptation. There is accordingly a very popular story about a brother 
and sister who become lovers, die, and become the source of sacred magic. 
The guilty act comes about against the will of the two young people, when the 
sister accidentally brushes against some love potion the brother had prepared 
to gain the love of another woman. She pursues her horrified brother until he, 
as Malinowski relates it, "exhausted and overcome, allowed his sister to catch 
hold of him, and the two fell down, embracing in the shallow water of the 
caressing waves. Then , ashamed and remorseful, but with the fire of their love 
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not quenched, they went to the grotto of Bokaraywata where they remained 
without food, without drink, and without sleep. There also they died, clasped 
in one another's arms, and through their linked bodies there grew the sweet-
smelling plant of the native mint . ' ' The myth goes on to tell of the discovery of 
the bodies, the magic of the plant, and the taboos and ritual that arose from 
these, now almost sacred, events (127-28). 
Here we have the same confusion of guilt with innocence, the same 
"guiltless guilt ," the punished shame which becomes a noble sacrifice, the 
expiation of innocent sin which sanctifies yet fills the hearers with sympathy, 
horror, and awe—the same elements, that is, that we find in the stories of 
Oedipus, Tristan and Isolde, and dozens of other tragic tales of our own 
culture. 
Now there is nothing particularly mystic, majestic, or sublime about all of 
this, but it is important all the same. It dramatizes the conflict of will and 
morality. It represents a way of coming to terms with that conflict, of 
acknowledging those desires we passionately believe to be shameful, yet of 
somehow freeing ourselves from the guilt that desire implies. If we turn now to 
King Oedipus with this rather cold and clinical light, we find it loses some of its 
luster. Raphael quotes a doubltessly often-made observation, that "no 
member of Sophocles' audience was likely to suppose himself in any danger of 
murdering his father and marrying his mother through the extraordinary 
chances that brought such a fate to Oedipus" and thus would have no reason 
to experience " fear" as Aristotle defines it (16). That is true only if you insist 
on perfect literalness; as a symbolic, dreamlike acknowledgement and re-
pudiation of guilty desires, the stories as Freud suggests, might well hit home. 
Even if Freud was wrong about the universality of the Oedipus complex (it 
seems unlikely that our society fears patricide with the intensity of Greek 
society), we seem to be fascinated by the very irrationality of the Oedipus 
story—the undeniable fact of the terrible deeds combined with absolute 
innocence of intention. Thus the discussions of the tragic hero as a "great 
man who struggles against his fate" dissolve in this prosaic light into a matter 
of the projection of guilty desires onto something outside oneself, a pattern of 
thought E.R. Dodds finds to be characteristic of the Greeks of an earlier 
period (30-31). And the action of the play actually supports this view, for 
despite the assertion of Fergusson, endlessly repeated in freshman classrooms, 
that the action of the play is " the quest for Laius' slayer'' (36), that is not what 
we actually see Oedipus doing. It is his announced intention, but the words 
are hardly out of his mouth when we are told who the slayer is. He spends 
most of the rest of the play futilely denying his guilt and asserting his 
innocence. King Oedipus is the symbolic mimesis of the vain denial of guilt. 
This play—so atypical in nearly every other way—is indeed the quintessential 
tragedy, because the necessary and defining characteristic of traditional 
tragedy is a protest against guilt. Its appeal is that it allows us to repudiate our 
sins—while accepting the judgment that declares them to be sins—by 
divorcing them from our wills. It protests for us: " M y sins are my misfortune, 
my doom, my fate; I am a good and noble person despite t hem." 
Now we return to my original insistence that our definition of the tragic be 
"value-free." Our insistence on seeing the action of Oedipus as somehow 
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sublime or elevated in terms of our own values has seriously distorted our view of 
it. Why else could we so easily swallow the notion that Oedipus ' objective 
throughout the play is " t o find the slayer" when that interpretation flies so 
plainly in the face of fact—the fact that Oedipus ' real objective, the one that 
truly interests us, is his heroic, pathetic, and terrifying attempt to deny 
culpability? Because we want to see the protagonist as pursuing a noble goal 
and sacrificing himself in the process; because we share with Oedipus the 
desire to deny guilt. People acknowledge this irrational aspect of tragic heroes, 
especially Oedipus, by speaking of them as "divine scapegoats," implying 
that the irrational in tragedy takes us into some form of sublime metaphysics. 
Perhaps that makes sense in certain religious interpretations of experience, 
but I, from my rationalist standpoint, can find nothing sublime about the 
dumping of one's burdened conscience onto a scapegoat, and the awarding of 
the "d iv ine" epithet seems to me but meager compensation. What I do find is 
ethical irresponsibility, but I do not condemn the play on that account, for it is 
ambiguous on that point as on many others: Oedipus is both innocent and 
guilty; he both denies and then accepts his guilt. I do insist that the play first 
reaches us on a fundamentally and unresolvably nonrational level. It speaks to 
our divided souls. Like Oedipus , we strive mightily to be good and to insist on 
our innocence; like him we are also forced to admit and feel the pain of guilt. 
The pagan, the Christian and the rationalist will interpret that mythic action 
in different ways, but the experience is universal. Freud was essentially right, 
but his scope was too narrow. The hypothesis of a universal Oedipus complex 
(which would not in any case explain the response of women to the play) is 
unnecessary. 
Recognizing the irrationality of Sophocles' play helps us out of another 
difficulty, involving the nature of Oedipus ' " t ragic flaw," which stems in part 
from the assumption, itself questionable, that Aristotle saw the Oedipus as the 
"perfect" tragedy. The attempt to rationalize Oedipus as an Aristotelian 
tragedy has led some to the absurd notion that hamartia refers in the Poetics to 
an innocent mistake. It is absurd for two reasons. First, whatever Aristotle's 
exact meaning, the context makes it unambiguously clear that the term is 
morally mixed but not morally neutral. Second, it implies that a story of a 
man who fails to watch where he is going and dies in a chariot crash is as tragic 
as one about a man who kills his father and beds his mother. It is also 
unnecessary to resort to explanations about the Greeks having had different 
theories of moral responsibility from ours; we too can feel guilt without having 
had evil intentions, as anyone who has accidentally harmed a loved one must 
know. Oedipus is about the pain of guilt, not willful responsibility; about 
human feeling, not about moral theory. 
If Oedipus is representative of tragedy, we might tentatively venture a 
definition: Tragedy presents the downfall of someone whose own actions have 
in some way produced that downfall. Those actions are presented as in some 
sense or some degree morally wrong, yet the protagonist is presented in such a 
way as to invite us to enter empathically into his or her experience; we are 
made to see the protagonist as, in Aristotle's phrase, "like u s , " rather than as 
a guilty "o the r " whose presence is a threat and whose removal is a relief. 
That is all that is necessary: a hero who vicariously expiates our guilt while 
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simultaneously affirming our worth. Tragedy affirms guilt when it acknowl-
edges the need for expiation (otherwise it would be mere wrongful suffering— 
the stuff of melodrama), yet somehow denies that very guilt in the purity of its 
hero. It is from this single trait that all the other characteristics of tragedy are 
derived; it is the entire justification for the nobility of the hero and the 
unhappy ending, and it is the reason for the inevitably ambivalent world-view. 
Let us test this definition by applying it to Macbeth which has been used 
before as a test case since it is a rare, if not unique, instance of a generally 
accepted " t ragedy" that portrays the downfall of a villain (Bradley 87-90). 
The usual rationalization of the plight of Oedipus—"a great man who 
struggles vainly against his destiny"—breaks down rather thoroughly in the 
case of Macbeth, but our definition does not. Shakespeare's notable achieve-
ment in Macbeth is to allow us to enter sympathetically into the mind of a 
villain and never to permit us totally to forget the "milk of human kindness" 
in his veins, even in the face of his bloodiest deeds. Macbeth, although 
recognized as extreme, is almost always acknowledged as a tragedy; the status 
of Romeo and Juliet as a tragedy, on the other hand, is often questioned. The 
usual reason given is that the unhappy ending lacks inevitability, that it is 
contrived and fortuitous, yet such objections are never raised about the 
equally accidental series of circumstances that produce the pile of corpses 
concluding Hamlet. I suggest that the real difference in our attitudes to these 
two plays is dependent on our ethical valuation of the protagonists. Hamlet 's 
guilt, however qualified, is still perceptible (however much we may admire 
him, he is directly or indirectly responsible for most of the deaths in the play), 
but the "star-crossed" lovers have been purified by time, and we now reserve 
all our censure for the quarreling families. That this is a crucial distinction can 
be seen when we notice how perception changes depending on where we look: 
if we focus on the lovers themselves we are apt to think of their deaths as 
contrived and accidental; if we concern ourselves with their parents, we are 
inclined to see them as responsible for—the causes of—their children's deaths. 
Our perception of causality is influenced by our perception of guilt. 
It is easy to see why tragedy has appeared at crucial times in history, times 
when values are being reassessed. It is also easy to see why tragedy has 
provided great dramatists the opportunity to create great drama. Tragedy is a 
natural framework for the exploration of profound moral questions and for 
searching investigations of the causes of suffering. But drama need not present 
a particular point of view to these questions in order to be " t rag ic . " " G r e a t " 
drama is, after all, typically characterized by its asking questions for which 
there are no simple answers. And tragedy need not be great. In fact, there are 
a number of such tragedies—as we have defined tragedy—that are apt to 
appear quite bad, even repugnant, to our taste, but which were greatly 
successful in their own time. They may also have served an important 
function, the success of which resulted in their present disfavor. For if we 
honestly and objectively examine the notion of the " t r ag ic , " in its special, 
"sacred" sense, full of "guiltless guilt" and the sacred nobility of the guilty-
innocent tragic hero, we will find that this notion of tragedy, although 
fundamentally dishonest and illogical, has the incalculable value of pointing 
out to us the points at which our moral imperatives have become obstacles to 
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moral progress. And this sacred yet mundane quality inheres as much in The 
Octoroon and The Second Mrs. Tanqueray as it does in Othello and Oedipus, Zoe and 
Paula are fully tragic heroines, in this sense, for they are guilty of transgress-
ing deeply felt taboos, yet are strangely and sympathetically innocent. 
Fictional, guilty, and sacrificial victims, they are yet pioneers who point the 
way to a future in which they will no longer be seen as guilty, no longer needed 
for sacrifice, and thus no longer in need of fictional justifications. Their 
tragedies are important for us, as the heirs of the Western tradition, because 
they have provided the necessary prelude to moral revolution and a prologue 
to moral enlightenment—which is to say that they served as a covert forum for 
the discussion of taboos still too strong to bear much honest examination by 
ordinary people, and thus tentatively prepared for the destruction of the very 
principles upon which their "tragic stories" were based. 
But that does not make The Octoroon great art, nor its author a great artist. 
What, then, is the difference, if tragedy can be so high and yet so mean, 
between the most ordinary varieties of the form and the most noble? I think 
that the real difference is one of poetry, profundity and purpose rather than of 
genre and form. Great tragedy is great because it still is capable of interesting 
us in some dimension of the great moral struggle which it portrays. Second-
rate tragedy—although I must insist upon its inestimable value as a beacon of 
moral progress—is second-rate because it no longer interests us in the moral 
questions that it raises. We no longer regard it as an open question whether a 
woman of mixed race should be allowed to marry whom she chooses or 
whether a "woman with a pas t" should be eternally ostracized. There is 
perhaps another crucial element: the tragic protagonist who lacks genuine 
moral complexity, who is all purity and goodness except for that single 
damning flaw, is particularly apt to appear to a society that does not accept the 
validity of that damning judgment as a mere scapegoat, a receptacle for the 
guilty conscience of the age. O n the other hand, Sophocles can still interest us 
in Antigone's struggle of religious conscience against the demands of civic 
loyalty even though we do not share her specific beliefs. Perhaps all tragic 
protagonists serve partly as fictional scapegoats, but if we cannot empathize, 
either with the protagonist or her moral struggle, we will tend to see her fate as 
an embarrassing injustice committed by art as well as by society. 
The nineteenth century produced scores of such second-rate (and by that I 
do not mean merely poorly written) tragedies, mostly about the fates of 
* ' ta inted" women, but tragedy of any sort has become, for our age, a peculiar 
genre. It is not surprising that Shaw was incapable of conventional tragedy, if 
tragedy demands (however covertly) expiation of guilt. Shaw quite explicitly 
and emphatically rejected the idea of expiation, regarding it as a moral horror. 
Shaw is not alone; the notion of retributive justice, the idea that one can 
" p a y " for one's misdeeds through suffering, although by no means extinct, is 
far less popular now than it once was. Supernaturally ordained retributive 
justice is an inevitable part of the background in all of the plays we have 
traditionally classed as great tragedy. Even if that is not the element that 
concerns us now, we sense its importance when we talk about the "inev-
itability" of tragedy in spite of the fact that most of our esteemeed tragedies 
could have easily turned out differently. In fact, the tragic outcome is 
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inevitable only when we accept the notion that guilt exacts punishment, it is 
satisfying because release from guilt is satisfying, and the real "tragic 
fallacy1'—the belief that separates the ages of tragic writing from our own—is 
faith in the efficacy of expiation. 
So tragedy and farce are linked not merely as opposites on our scale of 
values; they are joined by their obsession with our guilty desires. The one 
repudiates guilt and vanquishes it with expiation while the other glories in the 
desire and extinguishes guilt with laughter. Stark Young once suggested a 
connection between poetic tragedy and farce in the abstract, heightened 
quality of each (177). There are other similarities. Both thrive in an 
atmosphere of absolute moral values and allow us to acknowledge sinful 
desires by denying them at the same time. Farce in effect declares " I ' m only 
joking," and tragedy protests with Lear that " I am . . . more sinn'd against 
than sinning.' ' Thus both provide a means of expressing the conflict of duty 
and desire before it is acceptable to openly question that duty. Tragedy, 
whether that of Phaedra or Paula Tanqueray, is in the extreme and wonderful 
position of stretching moral definitions to the limit. There is yet another 
connection, symbolic and archetypal, between the two forms in the primitive 
power whose hold on us we acknowledge every time we "touch wood. ' ' Greek 
tragedy is associated with the concept ofphthonos, the jealousy of the gods, and 
hubris, the pride that tempts providence; Renaissance tragedy was born out of 
a similar concept, the turn of the wheel of fortune which inevitably brings 
down the high. The fool, the symbol of farce as the king is the symbol of 
tragedy, gains the protection of kings because he has the magic property of 
warding off the Evil Eye, the jealousy of the gods. Having nothing to lose, he 
triumphs over fortune and is impervious to bad luck. But the proud king, 
when he attracts and is destroyed by fortune's divine lightning, is reduced to 
the condition of the fool, acquires the fool's sacred invulnerability to fortune, 
and is himself sought by kings. Like the eternal myth, like the fabulous snake 
swallowing its own tail, tragedy meets farce and consumes it in a region 
beyond reason. Perhaps that is why Erasmus, counselor to kings, addressed a 
royal lecture with the title: 
Autfatuum aut regem nasci oportere. 
Adages 1.3.1. 
Florida State University, Tallahassee 
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